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Abstract
This paper intends to contribute to the literature by providing
empirical evidence on the relation between public capital stock and
government eﬃciency. We present some objective indicators fo gov-
ernment eﬃciency and explore the mentioned relation. we ﬁnd a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant relation between both variables that survives the
introduction of controls and robustness cheking
11 Introduction
Economists have long been preoccupied with the eﬃciency of public insti-
tutions and in particular with the eﬃciency in which governments render
their services. The high quality of the public institutions should be able to
guarantee the good functioning of democracies. Only under good operating
public institutions we can assure that policies have a good and long eﬀect
on income [45]. There are however several questions that have not yet been
answered in a consensual way concerning this topic: What exactly is meant
by ”government eﬃciency”? Why are some governments eﬃcient while oth-
ers are not? Can politicians determine some policy choices that aﬀect the
quality of government?
First things come ﬁrst: what is government quality?. In [26], good gov-
ernment stands for ”good-for-capitalistic development”. The authors deﬁne
a set of proprieties that a good government should have: a good government
protects property rights, intervenes little and taxes lightly; it has a small
dimension and a well- functioning bureaucracy free of corruption; it is po-
litically free and sustained by a democracy; it provides public goods of high
quality and, ﬁnally, it is eﬃcient.
Not all these features are consensual among the literature [24], and so
we will reduce the scope of the deﬁnition and consider that: a good govern-
ment is a government that provides services, in essential sectors like health
and education, in an eﬃcient way, i.e., where the relation between output
indicators and the amount of resources necessary to achieve them is high.
Then, to measure it we must compare government output in a given sector
with the amount of resources/money necessary to provide that quantity of
output1. Health and education are two of the most important sectors of
government provision [41]. According to the World Development Indicators,
average health expenditure (public and private) in the nineties was around
5,5% of GDP in the United Sates and the United Kingdom, almost 7% in Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Norway or Switzerland and above 7% in Germany,
1Virtually any speciﬁc service can be provided and ﬁnanced by the state and/or the
private sector, so government eﬃciency needs to take into account the source of the ﬁnanc-
ing. Moreover it could be argued that the distribution of ﬁncaning between the state and
privates could interfere in eﬃciency. Statistically this distribution turned out irrelevant.
2France and Sweden. In what concerns education, the data is as striking. In
USA and UK more than 5% of GDP was spent in education; in Canada and
Finland this number rises to almost 7% and in Denmark, Norway or Sweden
it goes way beyond 7%. In addition, in these two sectors there are ample
quantiﬁable measures of output as well as information on sectorial public
spending.
Lets now turn to the determinants of quality. In [26] those determinants
are grouped in three categories: Economic, Political and Cultural. In [24]
these determinants are explored in an empirical way and the case is made for
most of them. In this paper we intend to look at a speciﬁc determinant of
government eﬃciency: public investment in public capital. The literature on
public capital is considerable but it does not explore in a thorough way its
linkages with government performance. There is evidence that there is some
relation between public capital and economic growth [39]; that public capital
has some boosting eﬀect on productivity [28]; and a wide literature on the
linkage between public capital and output (see for example [20]). However
it has not yet been established with accuracy the transmission mechanism
that guide these relations. In paper [24] the argument is made for a direct
relation between government quality and public capital (more precisely public
investment in public capital), and it is also stated that there is a positive
contribution of government eﬃciency to output and growth.
This paper intends to contribute to the literature by providing some em-
pirical evidence of this relation. The paper is structured as follows: in section
2 we will present the data and the indicators that assess government quality.
In section 3 we will try and explore the relation between government quality
and public capital . Finally in section 4 we conclude.
2 Data
2.1 Deﬁnitions and Sources
The data used to construct the eﬃciency indicators presented below was
taken from the World Development Indicators 2000.
32.2 Dependent Variables
In this paper we will use the measures of government performance built in
[24]:
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The choice of Education is due to the fact of this sector beeing one of the
fundamental sectors in any society. We use two measures of output (Drop
out rate and illiteracy rate). We decided to conﬁrm our results testing also
a measure from the health sector (infant mortality)2. Our main focus is the
eﬃciency in the use of government resources, which means that more than
being concerned with the output we are interested in its relation with the
amount of resources spent to deliver it. For that purpose we do not use
output per se but ratios of each of the output variables to public spending
in the corresponding sector.
2.3 Regression Results
In [25] a model of endogenous growth with government quality is presented.
In that model the government has to decide wether is going to spend its
resources in investment in public capital or in a consumption good. Govern-
ment quality is presented has being produce through a production function
that has as single input per capita: public capital. The idea is that if govern-
ments want to achieve a certain level of quality they have to invest. Quality
depends on an input that has to be accumulated, it demands an eﬀort from
2As we refered previously this ares the two sectors that consume consitently a bigger
cut from government budget.
4the state whereas physical goods (the consumption goods) does not demand
such an eﬀort. On the government side of the economy we have:
Ht = θτyt
·






qt stand for government quality and it dependes on per capita public
capital
kgt
Lt . Ht is a public consumption good and the amount of money spent
to deliver it is a percentage (θ) of public revenue (τy). We want to conﬁrm
if the relation between quality and public capital is supported by empirical







Where µt represents the usual white noise variable.
We used as quality indicators the measures presented in the previous
section and also the measures used in [26] to see if the results hold. The data
on public capital was taken from [19]. The data used to construct the quality
indicatores was taken from World Development Indicators data set 2004. We
used ﬁve year avarages raging form 1970 to 2000 in a total of 22 countries3. In
table 9 we can see the results concerning the direct relation between quality
measures and per capita public capital and also a broader speciﬁcation where
we considered as control variables the ones that preformed consistently better
in the previous section.
3We try to use the complete panel but the mos we got was 224 observations which is
considerably small. We also tried pooled data without averaging but we beleieve that we
were loosing much information about the diversity between countries.
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Knowing that an increase in any of our quality measures means that
we are better oﬀ we can see that, with exception of logirpse (where the
relation is non signiﬁcant) we have a positive and signiﬁcant relation between
government eﬃciency and per capita public capital. This relation survives
the inclusion of the control variables. In the case of logirpse the inclusion
of control variables makes the relation between government eﬃciency and
public capital signiﬁcant and positive. Note that there is an extremly high
correlation between loggdppc and logKgpc. This implies that including this
control variable will bring multicolineartiy to the model. This alone can
justiﬁe the diference in estimates when control variables are introduces.
To see if the relation between government quality and public capital was,
in fact, robust we also tried diﬀerent measures of quality4. In table 10 we
can see that the results are basically the same.
Table10 loglo logCorrup logBureau logPR

























4More precisely the ones used by the authors in [26]. We have already seen that this
measures capture a diﬀerent realty and that are diﬀerent in nature.
6The basic regression (without the controls) tell us that the bigger the
stock of public capital is the bigger will the dependent variable be. Not
that with exception of PR an increase in all the other indexes means an
improvement in government quality. The results also survive the introduction
of the control variables. Although the signiﬁcance drops we can see that in
three of the four cases public capital is still relevant in explaining government
quality (in the case of PR the estimate has now the right sign).
73 Conclusion
Throughout the literaturewe ﬁnd several links between public capital and
other economic variables, namely growth. The mechanisns through which
this links are established are frequently not clear. We believe that those
mechanisms are related with government eﬃceincy. More precisely we be-
lieve that the choices of government about the percentage invested in public
capitlla are directly realted to government quality, which in turn allows for
higher and more consinsten growth.
We did ﬁnd an interesting and signiﬁcant relation between the stock of
public capital and the government eﬃciency. This relation survived the in-
troduction of control variables and was valid weather we considered our mea-
sures of eﬃciency weather we used more subjective and qualitative measures
of performance.
The measures of government eﬃciency presented are objective and easily
quantiﬁable and capture a diﬀerent reality form the measures used so far
(mainly qualitative measures). In the present economic and social scenario,
we have developed countries with limited budgets and extremely vulnerable
to economic cycles. It is harder to come up with more inﬂows and government
expenditures are diﬃcult to restrain. We have governments that cannot
expand and that have an urgent need in gaining eﬃciency. Knowing what’s
behind such eﬃciency can be determinant for a government in a developed
country in a rapidly changing world.
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